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COMMENTS
FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES
OF ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
An antenuptial contract is an agreement entered into prior to mar-
riage by which prospective spouses may alter the normal incidents of
marital property rights.' Such contracts are considered conducive to
marital tranquility and are generally regarded favorably by the
courts.2 A variety of provisions may be contained in antenuptial con-
tracts. For example, the parties may relinquish rights in each other's
property and estate which they would otherwise acquire by reason of
the marriage;3 they may release their distributive shares in each oth-
1. See generally 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CON-
TRACTS § 90 (rev. ed. 1967). Rights arising as a result of marriage include (a) conjugal
rights such as consortium and support and (b) marital property rights such as dower,
curtesy, community property, widow's allowance, homestead rights, rights in intestacy,
and the right of election to take against a deceased spouse's will. A. LINDEY, supra
at 90-57. Marital property rights can be altered by antenuptial contract (see discus-
sion in notes 2-6 infra), but conjugal rights cannot. In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.
3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976); In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d
476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); Eule v. Eule, 24 II1. App. 3d 83, 320
N.E.2d 506 (1974); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); A. LINDEY,
supra at 90-26.
2. See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 301, 494 P.2d 208, 213(1972); A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 90-30. See also In re Marriage of Hadley, 88
Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977) (applying the Friedlander requirements to deter-
mine the validity of property status agreements entered into during marriage).
Some of the basic rules to be considered in drafting antenuptial contracts are as
follows: (1) the marriage itself is sufficient consideration to support the agreement;
(2) the agreement must make a fair and reasonable provision for the spouse waiving
his or her marital rights, or, alternatively, there must be a full and frank disclosure of
the worth of the spouse benefiting from the agreement; (3) the spouse waiving his or
her marital rights must sign the agreement freely and voluntarily, preferably with ad-
vice of independent counsel with full knowledge of his or her rights; (4) an engage-
ment to marry creates a confidential relationship between the parties; therefore, if the
contract makes inadequate provision for the spouse waiving his or her marital rights,
the burden of proving the validity of the contract falls upon the party asserting it.
Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); A. LINDEY, supra
note 1. It should be noted that the antenuptial contract in Friedlander was denied en-
forcement because it failed to make a fair and reasonable provision for the wife, and
because the husband failed to prove that he had made a full, frank disclosure of his
property and his worth to his prospective wife before the antenuptial contract was
signed. 80 Wn. 2d at 302, 494 P.2d at 214.
3. An antenuptial contract can validly alter the rights each spouse will have in the
property of the other due to the marriage. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865(1967); In re Strickland's Estate, 181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967); In re Perl-
man's Estate, 438 Pa. 112, 263 A.2d 375 (1970); A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 90-57
to 90-61.
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er's estate or surrender their rights to take against one another's will, 4
the wife may forego her dower, or the husband his curtesy; 5 the agree-
ment may alter the operation of the community property system, 6 or
possibly provide for a property settlement in the event of dissolution
or divorce. 7
Often such agreements will include provisions for one or both
spouses to transfer property to the other either before or after the mar-
riage.8 When such transfer provisions are included, there may be im-
portant federal tax consequences. As a result of the growing number
of marriage dissolutions and the consequent increase in families in
which spouses have remarried, both spouses work, and one or both
have stepchildren, the use and significance of the antenuptial contract
is increasing.9 As the number of antenuptial agreements involving
transfers of property grows, it is essential that persons utilizing such
contracts be aware of the tax consequences.
This comment will examine the federal gift, estate, and income tax
consequences of antenuptial contracts. Each of these taxes will be dis-
cussed separately. Antenuptial contracts which provide for the
transfer of property arise more frequently in common law property
states, where spouses have inchoate rights in one another's property,
4. Cummings v. Wood, 197 Iowa 1356, 199 N.W. 369 (1923); In re Sunshine,
40 N.Y.2d 875, 357 N.E.2d 999, 389 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1976); A. LINDEY, supra note 1,
at 90-60.
5. Dickason v. English, 272 Ill. 368, 112 N.E. 65 (1916); In re Moore's Estate,
210 Or. 23, 307 P.2d 483 (1957); A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 90-60.
6. In most jurisdictions spouses may contract before marriage to change com-
munity property into separate property, or separate property into community property.
See In re Wahlefeld's Estate, 105 Cal. App. 770, 288 P. 870 (1930); Hamlin v.
Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954); Cross, The Community Property Law
in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 809 (1974).
7. The status of such provisions is unclear. It is often stated that those antenuptial
contracts which provide for an amount of alimony or a property settlement in the
event of separation or divorce encourage divorce and are against public policy and
unenforceable. See A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 90-27; id. at 323 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
There are indications, however, that this general rule is under attack. See In re Mar-
riage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976). See generally
A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 325 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Antenuptial contracts providing
for a waiver of alimony in the event of divorce have been upheld providing the wife
has adequate means of her own. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972);
Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973). See also 10 WILLAMETTE
LJ. 117 (1973) (discussing Unander). In addition, contracts providing for payments
in lieu of alimony in the event of divorce have been upheld against a wife claiming
that the contract was void. Volid v. Volid, 6 Il. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
8. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S.
308 (1945); Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
9. See generally Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 692
(1972); 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 117 (1973).
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than in community property states, where the spouses share the com-
munity property equally.' 0 In the antenuptial contract setting, federal
taxes are imposed upon the transfer of property; when an antenuptial
contract provides for a transfer of property, there are no differences
in the federal tax consequences between common law property and
community property systems. There are, however, some provisions
which are unique to community property jurisdictions, and the com-
ment concludes with a brief discussion of the tax consequences of
agreements altering community property rights.
I. GIFT TAX
A. Consideration Required to Avoid Tax
Federal gift taxes attach to transfers of property "for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."" An
agreement to transfer property in consideration of either the marriage
or the release of the prospective spouse's marital rights involves gift
tax consequences because neither a promise to marry nor a release of
marital rights is considered adequate consideration in "money or
money's worth" for estate and gift tax purposes.' 2
10. For background material on common law and community property systems,
see T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS §§ 15, 29, 30 (2d ed. 1953); W. DEFUNIAK & M. J.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 [hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK];
Cross, supra note 6.
11. I.R.C. § 2512(b).
12. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324
U.S. 308 (1945).
I.R.C. § 2512(b) provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property
exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be in-
cluded in computing the amount of gifts made during the calendar quarter.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) provides: "A consideration not reducible to a value
in money or money's worth, as... [a] promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly dis-
regarded, and the entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of
the gift."
The amount of a gift to a spouse which is actually taxed, however, is substantially
reduced by the marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2523 (1954), as amended by Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(b), 90 Stat. 1806, 1854. This provision in-
creases the marital deduction for transfers between spouses. The first $100,000 of such
gifts is entirely deductible. Thereafter, the deduction allowed is 50% of lifetime trans-
fers in excess of $200,000. The estate tax marital deduction is reduced by the amount
of the marital deduction allowed for lifetime transfers in excess of 50% of the value
of the transfers (i.e., where lifetime gifts eligible for the marital deduction are less
than $200,000). H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976). For a discussion
of the estate tax marital deduction, see note 32 infra.
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A promise of marriage by the donee- is not sufficient consideration
to prevent a transfer of property from being taxed as a gift under sec-
tion 2512(b). 13 The test requiring receipt by the donor of "money or
money's worth" was found controlling by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 14 even though the donee prospective
spouse stood to lose a substantial trust fund by marrying. 15 The court
also held that the existence vel non of donative intent was not the es-
sential issue in determining whether or not there was a gift.' 6
The release of marital rights also will not provide sufficient consid-
eration to create a tax-free transfer under an antenuptial contract. 17
The gift tax provision of the Internal Revenue Code' 8 makes no spe-
cific reference to relinquishment of dower or curtesy, but the estate
tax provision' 9 explicitly provides that release of such rights is not
consideration in "money or money's worth." The Supreme Court has
reasoned that the two taxes are similar in purpose and should be con-
strued alike in order to discourage tax avoidance and carry out the
basic statutory purpose of the gift tax.20
13. See note 12 supra.
14. 324 U.S. 303 (1945). The taxpayer desired to marry a widow who had a child.
The widow's deceased husband had set up two trusts, with the income going equally
to the widow and child. Upon her remarriage, all the income from the trusts would
go to the child. To induce the widow to marry him, the taxpayer executed an agree-
ment transferring stock to her to replace her forfeited trust income.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 306. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958), adopted after Wemyss,
states:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the
application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is based on
the objective facts of the transfer, and the circumstances under which it is made,
rather than on the subjective motives of the donor.
17. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). The taxpayer in Merrill was extremely
wealthy. An antenuptial agreement with his prospective wife provided that she release
all rights in his property which she would otherwise acquire as a wife or widow in
exchange for his establishing an irrevocable trust for her benefit and testamentary
trusts for the benefit of their surviving children. The court found the wife's release in-
sufficient consideration and taxed the trusts as gifts.
18. I.R.C. § 2512(b), quoted at note 12 supra.
19. I.R.C. § 2043(b) provides:
For purposes of this chapter, a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of
dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or
of other marital rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall not be considered
to any extent a consideration "in money or money's worth."
20. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1945). An important purpose of the
gift tax is to prevent the avoidance of estate taxes by taxing inter vivos transfers of
property which, except for their gift quality, would be subject to the estate tax. San-
ford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939). To hold that the release of
dower by a wife during her husband's life constitutes consideration for any transfer
by him defeats this purpose because it would permit an untaxed transfer by gift of
property which otherwise would be subject to estate tax at the husband's death. Com-
missioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
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In short, in order to avoid gift tax liability, the donor must receive
something which is deemed to be adequate consideration. The release
of marital rights or promise of marriage by the donee does not satisfy
this requirement.
B. Effective Date of the Gift
Once one has identified those types of transactions which will
create gift tax liability, the additional problem arises of determining
when such a gift will be effective. An antenuptial agreement becomes
binding upon the marriage of the parties.2 ' Because the donor be-
comes contractually obligated to make the transfer at that time, the
question is raised whether the donor is liable for the value of the gift
tax at the time of the marriage, or when the property is ultimately
transferred. Court decisions and IRS Revenue Rulings have estab-
lished that the full value of the gift is subject to the gift tax at the time
of marriage,22 provided the gift is susceptible of valuation.23 The full
value of the gift is taxed even when it consists of a series of payments
and is subject to contingencies. 24 It should be noted, however, that the
full value will be calculated according to recognized actuarial
principles25 in determining a donor's taxable gift for a given tax
period. 26
21. Estate of Copley v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17 (1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 364
(7th Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227; 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
270B (3d ed. 1959).
22. See Estate of Copley v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17 (1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d
364 (7th Cir. 1952). In Copley, taxpayer and his intended wife entered into an ante-
nuptial agreement in 1931. Copley agreed to give her a specified sum of money in
consideration of the marriage and in lieu of all her marital rights in his property. No
date was specified for the payments, which were actually made in 1936 and 1944. The
tax court held that a gift tax would have been due in 1931 if there had been a gift tax
law in effect at that time, because under state law, the agreement became legally en-
forceable on the date of the marriage.
See also Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227. The taxpayer and his prospective wife
entered into an antenuptial contract which provided that in consideration of her re-
lease of marital property rights he would pay her a fixed amount per year after their
marriage for a period of 20 years or until her death. Even though the gift was subject
to the contingency of the wife's death, the Service ruled that, because the taxpayer
became legally obligated to perform the contract upon marriage, the gift was complete
at that time.
23. See Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953). But see Rev.
Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227. For a discussion of the problems of valuation, see note
57 infra.
24. See Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227, discussed at note 22 supra.
25. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958).
26. The total amount of annual gifts made minus the annual exclusion and allow-
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II. ESTATE TAX
Antenuptial contracts can create estate tax problems in several situ-
ations. In each of these, the issue is whether or not the property trans-
ferred is deductible from the value of the gross estate. For example,
one spouse may have agreed to leave the other a fixed sum at death; 21
one spouse may have agreed to establish a testamentary trust to pay
his or her surviving spouse periodic payments for life; 28 or, the
spouses may have agreed to leave to the surviving spouse a life estate
in decedent spouse's property.29 In these and similar situations, the
taxpayer wishes to establish that the payments made or property
transferred by the antenuptial contract will be deductible, and thus
not taxed as part of the decedent's estate.
Taxpayers have attempted to obtain deductions. for such transfers
of property under two sections of the estate tax provisions. The deduc-
tions have been allowed under section 2056,30 which allows a marital
deduction for property passing from decedent to surviving spouse, but
have not been allowed under section 2053,31 which allows a deduc-
tion for claims against the estate.
A. Marital Deduction: Section 2056
Section 2056 provides that the value of the taxable estate is deter-
mined by deducting from the gross estate the value of any property
interest which passes from the decedent to his or her surviving spouse,
subject to certain conditions and limitations.32 The specific question
able deductions equals the amount of taxable gifts. I.R.C. § 2503; Treas. Reg. §
25.2503-1 (1958).
27. Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1938), aff'g 35
B.T.A. 866 (1937) (testator made a bequest to his wife in fulfillment of an antenuptial
agreement under which she was to be paid a certain sum if she survived him).
28. Estate of Rubin, 57 T.C. 817 (1972) (taxpayer agreed by terms of antenuptial
contract to devise 50% of his residuary estate to a trust to pay his wife $100 a week
for life with a remainder to his sons).
29. Estate of Pollard, 52 T.C. 741 (1969) (in an antenuptial agreement, husband
and wife waived all claims of dower, curtesy, or other statutory right in the property
of each other, and provided that the survivor would be entitled to a life estate in the
property of the other).
30. I.R.C. § 2056, discussed at note 32 infra.
31. I.R.C. § 2053, discussed at note 37 infra.
32. For example, no deduction is allowed for most terminable property interests.
I.R.C. § 2056(b). See note 36 infra for a discussion of deductible and nondeductible
110
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raised by antenuptial contracts is whether payment to a surviving
spouse pursuant to such an agreement is an "interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse"
for purposes of this section. Subsection 2056(d)33 allows only a lim-
ited number of methods by which property may be considered as
passing from decedent to another person. This subsection states that
property bequeathed or devised by a decedent qualifies, but it does
not specifically mention antenuptial contracts. It has been established,
however, that the value of an interest transferred to a surviving spouse
is deductible as long as the other statutory limitations are overcome, 34
because a transfer of property pursuant to the terms of an antenuptial
contract is no different from a devise or bequest of the same property.35
B. Terminable Interests: No Deduction as a Claim Against the
Estate Under Section 2053
No deduction is allowed under the marital deduction section of the
Code for most terminable interests transferred to a surviving spouse. 36
terminable interests. No deduction is allowed for amounts in excess of the maximum
marital deduction. I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1954), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1854. This section increases the maximum
estate tax marital deduction to the greater of $250,000 or 50% of the adjusted gross
estate. It also provides that the maximum estate tax marital deduction is to be re-
duced by the amount of the marital deduction allowed for lifetime transfers in excess
of 50% of the value of the transfers (i.e., when lifetime gifts eligible for the marital
deduction are less than $200,000). H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18(1976). For example, if a decedent left an adjusted gross estate of $300,000, the
maximum marital deduction is now $250,000. However, if the decedent had made a
lifetime gift of $100,000 to his or her spouse, the maximum marital deduction would
be $200,000 instead of $250,000 ($250,000 minus 50% of $100,000). If the lifetime
gift had been $150,000, the estate tax marital deduction would be limited to $225,000
($250,000 less the difference between $100,000 and 50% of $150,000).
33. I.R.C. § 2056(d).
34. See discussion at note 32 supra.
35. First Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 355 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1966); Rev. Rul. 68-271,
1968-1 C.B. 409. In the IRS ruling, decedent and his wife had entered into an ante-
nuptial agreement whereby she relinquished any marital rights she might acquire in
her prospective husband's property. In return, he agreed to pay her a fixed sum from
his estate, provided she survived him as his widow. After her husband's death, the
estate paid the sum based on the antenuptial contract pursuant to a claim filed by his
widow. She was not mentioned in her husband's will, nor was the will contested. The
deduction was allowed as a marital deduction. See Rev. Rul. 54-446, 1954-2 C.B.
303, in which decedent and his wife entered into an antenuptial contract whereby she
agreed to relinquish all her marital rights and he agreed to leave her specific property
by will at his death. In his will, decedent left her different property of greater value.
The value of the property was allowed as a marital deduction.
36. Estate of Krampf, 56 T.C. 293 (1971). A "terminable interest" in property is
one which will end on the lapse of time or on the occurrence of some contingency.
111
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As a result, some taxpayers have attempted to obtain a deduction for
such interests under section 2053.37 This section provides that the
value of the taxable estate is determined by deducting from the gross
estate the amount of claims against the estate, provided they were
contracted for adequate and full consideration. In addition, it explic-
itly provides that the relinquishment of marital rights is not adequate
consideration. Taxpayers have argued, thus far unsuccessfully, that
their antenuptial contracts are supported by consideration other than
the release of marital rights, and that such consideration is adequate
and full. The courts have not been persuaded, and deductions under
this section for the value of property passing under the terms of anten-
uptial contracts have not been allowed.
Taxpayers have argued specifically that the mutual obligations as-
sumed by a prospective husband and wife in an antenuptial contract
are adequate and full consideration within the meaning of section
2053. This argument was rejected in Estate of Pollard.38 Decedent
and her husband had executed an antenuptial agreement which pro-
vided that the survivor would be entitled to a life estate in the prop-
erty of the first to die, and the taxpayer asserted that the value of the
life estate qualified for a deduction as a claim against the estate.39 The
taxpayer argued that the reciprocal obligations assumed by the con-
tracting parties met the statutory requirement of adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth. Although noting that the
A life estate or an interest for a term of years are examples of terminable interests.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-l(b) (1958). A "nondeductible terminable interest" is
one which passes from decedent to some other person for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth after the termination of the spouse's
interest. Id. § 20.2056(b)-l(c). For example, if a prospective husband and wife enter
into a valid antenuptial contract, and one agrees to leave the other a life estate in his
or her property with a remainder to their children, this interest, although passing to
the surviving spouse for purposes of § 2056(d), is a nondeductible terminable interest.
See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Estate of Rubin, 57 T.C. 817
(1972); Estate of Myers, 27 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 975 (1968).
A property interest passing to a decedent's surviving spouse may be deductible even
though it is a terminable interest. I.R.C. § 2056(b). For example, if a surviving
spouse receives a right to income for life with a general power of appointment, the
interest is deductible. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-l(d) (1958).
37. § 2053(c) states: "The deduction allowed by this section in the case of claims
against the estate ...shall, when founded on a promise or agreement, be limited to
the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth." I.R.C. § 2053(e) then refers to § 2043(b), which
provides that a relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or other marital rights in decedent's
property is not to any extent a consideration in "money or money's worth."
38. 52T.C.741 (1969).
39. Id.at 741.
112
Vol. 53: 105, 1977
Antenuptial Contracts
mutual promises constituted adequate consideration under the law of
contracts, the court disagreed insofar as the tax consequences were
concerned: "This is in substance merely a contractual arrangement for
a testamentary disposition not within the intendment of the statute.
Such reciprocal arrangement 'for the benefit of the natural object of
each. .. [promisor's] bounty,' does not qualify as the kind of con-
sideration required by the statute .... -40
Another argument advanced is that a spouse releasing all of his or
her marital rights is actually giving up support rights which have been
accepted as adequate consideration. 41 This theory was rejected in Es-
tate of Rubin.42 In that case, the taxpayer and his wife entered into an
antenuptial agreement in which the wife released all her rights in her
husband's property, and the husband agreed to devise fifty percent of
his residuary estate to a trust to pay her $100 a week for life with a
remainder to his sons. The taxpayer contended that the claim was not
disallowed by subsection 2053(e),43 because the wife had agreed to
release her support rights rather than her marital rights. The court
disagreed:
The "support rights," the relinquishment of which has been held to
constitute consideration in money or money's worth, are the support
rights to which a wife is entitled during marriage and which she may
relinquish in a settlement agreement incident to a divorce. . . .They
do not refer to any rights a widow may claim as a result of her hus-
band's death.44
40. Id. at 745.
41. The distinction between support and marital rights has significant tax conse-
quences. Generally, a husband has a duty to support his wife during their joint lives
or until she remarries. E.g., Estate of Glen, 45 T.C. 323 (1966); Kinne v. Kinne, 82
Wn. 2d 360, 510 P.2d 814 (1973); Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414, 415. Transfers
of property in return for the release of support rights most often occur pursuant to
divorce, and the release of support rights constitutes a consideration in money or
money's worth for both estate and gift tax purposes. Estate of Ellman, 59 T.C. 367
(1972); Estate of Keller, 44 T.C. 851 (1965); Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 C.B. 374,
375. In contrast, marital rights are those rights which a surviving spouse may acquire
in decedent's property or estate by reason of the marriage. Estate of Glen, 45 T.C. 323
(1966); Rev. Rul. 60-160, supra, at 375. See note I supra.
Section 2056 of the Code and Treasury Regulation § 25.2512-8 state that the re-
lease of dower or curtesy or a statutory substitute for dower or curtesy (marital rights)
is not a consideration in money or money's worth. See Rev. Rul. 75-395, 1975-2
C.B. 370, which states that the debt of a decedent founded upon the release of a
spouse's marital rights in the property of the other spouse, rather than the release of
the right to support, is not deductible under § 2053(a)(3).
42. 57 T.C. 817 (1972).
43. I.R.C. § 2053(e), discussed at note 37 supra.
44. 57 T.C. at 825. Accord, Estate of Ellman, 59 T.C. 367 (1972) (release of a
113
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In short, if an interest cannot be taken as a marital deduction be-
cause of the terminable interest rule, its value will not be deductible as
a claim against the estate, because the release of marital rights is not
adequate consideration in "money or money's worth." Thus, section
2053 supplies no relief to parties executing an antenuptial contract.
To summarize briefly, property passing under the terms of an ante-
nuptial contract, as long as it is not a terminable interest, is deduct-
ible under the marital deduction provision of the Code because it
qualifies as an interest passing from the decedent to the surviving
spouse. Such property is not deductible as a claim against the estate,
because the antenuptial contract is based upon inadequate considera-
tion.
III. INCOME TAX
For income taxation, unlike estate and gift taxation, property trans-
ferred pursuant to an antenuptial contract in consideration of the re-
lease of marital rights is considered to have been for adequate and full
consideration. 45 Therefore, the transferor of appreciated property will
recognize gain and pay an income tax. The important ramifications of
this rule are discussed below.
A. Transferee's Basis in Property Transferred
The transferee's basis of property transferred under an antenuptial
agreement is the fair market value of the property at the time of the
transfer.46 The transfer is not considered a gift under section 1015,
which requires the transferee to take the transferor's basis with some
adjustment for the gift taxes paid.47
year's support during administration of deceased husband's estate pursuant to ante-
nuptial agreement not adequate consideration under I.R.C. § 2053).
45. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). The court
reasoned that the antenuptial contract required the donee to perform legally adequate
consideration, namely, "her promise to marry ...coupled with her promise to re-
linquish all rights in and to her prospective husband's property which she would
otherwise acquire by the marriage." 160 F.2d at 815. This same consideration, as
previously discussed, is deemed inadequate for estate and gift taxation.
46. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
47. I.R.C. § 1015 (1954), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1877, which provides that the basis of a gift made after Dec.
31, 1976, is the donor's basis plus the portion of gift taxes paid on the gift attributable
to the net appreciation on the gift. Net appreciation is defined as "the amount by which
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This rule was established in Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner.48
The court stated: "In our opinion the income tax provisions are not to
be construed as though they were in pan materia with either the estate
tax law or the gift tax statutes." 49 In Farid-Es-Sultaneh, the taxpayer
transferred stock to his wife pursuant to an antenuptial contract
whereby she agreed to marry him and release all her marital rights in
his property. She later sold some of the stock and reported a loss on
the sale, arguing that the transfer was not a gift, but rather a transfer
for adequate and full consideration. She had, accordingly, reported
her basis as the fair market value of the stock at the time of the trans-
fer, and not her husband's cost. The court found for the taxpayer:
Her inchoate interest in the property of her affianced husband greatly
exceeded the value of the stock transferred to her. It was a fair consid-
eration under ordinary legal concepts of that term for the transfers of
the stock by him. . . She performed the contract under the terms of
which the stock was transferred to her and held the shares not as a
donee but as a purchaser for a fair consideration. 50
Thus, the recipient of property under an antenuptial contract, in which
one prospective spouse releases marital rights in the other prospective
spouse's property, takes as a purchaser, and his or her basis is the fair
market value of the property at the time of the transfer. 51
B. Taxable Gain to Transferor
While a transferor of appreciated property normally realizes a tax-
able gain,52 the issue of taxable gain to the transferor under an ante-
nuptial agreement has not been directly addressed by the courts or by.
revenue rulings. Logically, the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
leading case involving transfer of property pursuant to a separation
the fair market value of the gift exceeds the donor's adjusted basis immediately before
the gift." I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6)(B).
48. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
49. Id. at 814-15.
50. Id. at 815. The IRS had labeled the transaction a gift and given the taxpayer
the donor's basis on the authority of Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945),
discussed at note 14 supra, and Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945), discussed at
note 17 supra. Both cases were distinguished in Farid-Es-Sultaneh.
51. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (dealing 'ith a-case in which a hus-
band transferred appreciated property to former wife in consideration of the release
of her dower rights; the ruling stated there is no gain or loss to the wife, and the
basis of the property to her is its fair market value on the date of the transfer).
52. I.R.C. § 1001.
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agreement, United States v. Davis,53 should be applicable to transfers
under antenuptial contracts.
In Davis, stock was transferred to the wife by the husband pursuant
to a property settlement and separation agreement incident to divorce.
The court stated that Congress clearly intended to tax the economic
growth of the stock as "'income from whatever source derived, in-
cluding. . . [g] ains derived from dealings in property.' "54 The issue
presented was when should the gain be taxed: at the time of the
transfer of the property from the husband to the wife, or later, when
and if the wife transferred the property? The court held that the gain
on the transfer was taxable to the husband when he transferred the
property to the wife because the transfer was in consideration of a "re-
lease of an independent legal obligation," 55 -his wife's inchoate mar-
ital rights in her husband's property, including, but not limited to,
dower and all rights under the laws of testacy and intestacy. 56
A transfer of property pursuant to an antenuptial contract is fre-
quently in exchange for the release of this same independent legal ob-
ligation: the prospective spouse's rights which would otherwise be
acquired as a result of the marriage. The transfer, therefore, is a tax-
able event, and the gain, if it can be measured,5 7 must be taxed to
53. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
54. Id. at 68 (quoting I.R.C. § 6 1(a)).
55. Id. at 69. Taxpayers have tried, unsuccessfully, to avoid the impact of the
Davis rule by arguing that the transferee spouse did not surrender an independent
legal obligation. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964)
(husband realized a long-term capital gain on the transfer of appreciated property to
former wife even though there was no express release of the wife's marital rights);
Matthews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (income tax imposed on
wife's transfer of appreciated stock to former husband; there was no gift even though
under Florida law the wife had no legal obligation to give the husband anything).
56. 370 U.S. at 67. Numerous commentators and organizations have criticized
the Davis rule. See, e.g., Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Prob-
len and a Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975); Report of the Committee on
Domestic Relations Tax Problems, 19 BULL. ABA SECTION OF TAXATION at 62, 64-66
(July 1966); Note, Should Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce Depend on
State Property Law?, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1976).
57. In order for a gain from the sale or exchange of property to be taxable, the
amount realized must be susceptible of valuation; if there is no ascertainable value,
the transaction is not a taxable event. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Com-
missioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960); Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 606 (1968); Rev. Rul. 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87.
The property received by the taxpayer in Davis was the release of the wife's marital
rights. The lower court had reasoned that there was no accurate method to determine
their fair market value, and that therefore it was impossible to determine the taxable
gain realized by the taxpayer. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held
that because the parties had acted at arm's length, the values of the properties ex-
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conform with congressional intent to tax as income "[g] ains derived
from dealings in property." Under the rule of Farid-Es-Sultaneh, the
gain is not taxable to the transferee, 58 whose basis is the fair market
value at the time of the transfer. Therefore, if the gain is to be taxed,
the tax must be assessed against the transferor at the time of the
transfer.59
C. Loss Not Deductible
While gain realized by a transferor under an antenuptial agreement
is subject to income tax, any loss is not deductible, whether the
transfer takes place prior to or after the marriage. If the transfer takes
place after the marriage, or prior to the marriage when the parties are
married by the end of the taxable year, any deduction for the loss is
explicitly prohibited by section 267,60 which disallows deductions for
losses from sales or exchanges of property between members of a
family. 61 If the transfer takes place prior to the marriage and the par-
ties are not married by the end of the taxable year, any deduction is
prohibited by section 165(c). 62 That section states that losses incurred
changed were presumed to be equal. Consequently, the taxpayer had a taxable gain
measured by the fair market value of the property at the time of the transfer minus
his cost.
In Davis, the Court assumed that the parties were acting at arm's length because
they were seeking divorce. In contrast, one may presume that parties to an antenuptial
contract do not deal at arm's length with one another; instead, their relationship is
one of mutual confidence and trust. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494
P.2d 208 (1972); A. LINDEY, supra note 1, at 90-41. Contra, In re Marriage of Daw-
ley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976). The argument could
therefore be made that, because of the confidential relationship, parties to an antenup-
tial contract do not necessarily judge the marital rights to be equal in value to the
property for which they were exchanged. Consequently, there would be no way to
compute the fair market value of the marital rights surrendered, and, therefore, no
way to determine the taxable gain realized by the taxpayer.
58. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
59. The gain to the transferor spouse may be treated as ordinary income, and not
capital gain. I.R.C. § 1239 provides that any gain realized on the sale or exchange of
depreciable property between husband and wife is ordinary income.
60. I.R.C. § 267. The transferee's basis for loss purposes is his cost and not the
transferor's basis, so the deduction, is permanently lost. I.R.C. § 1012. However, if
the transferee later sells or exchanges the property, he need recognize only so much
of the gain as is in excess of the transferor's basis. I.R.C. § 267.
61. I.R.C. § 267; McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947) (loss on
sale of stock sold indirectly by husband to wife through a stock exchange specifically
disallowed).
62. I.R.C. § 165(c) provides a limitation on losses allowed individuals. A loss is
allowed only if it was (1) incurred in a trade or business, (2) incurred in any trans-
action entered into for profit, or (3) a casualty loss.
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by an individual are deductible only if incurred in a transaction en-
tered into for profit.63
It is virtually inconceivable that a transfer pursuant to an antenup-
tial contract would be entered into for profit. The test to determine
whether a transaction has been entered into for profit is whether the
transaction is profit-motivated, either when the property is acquired
or when it is sold or exchanged. 64 If a transfer is made within the
context of a family relationship, and there is no evidence that the
transaction resembled a profit-motivated sale of property, (such as an
effort to obtain the best price possible), no loss will be allowed on the
sale or exchange. 65 In an antenuptial transfer, the transferor is ex-
changing property in return for the release of marital rights by the
prospective spouse; that he or she is making an effort to realize a
profit on the transaction is extremely unlikely.
In summary, any deduction for loss on the exchange of property
pursuant to the terms of an antenuptial contract will be disallowed by
section 267 or section 165(c).
D. Loss of Exclusion of Proceeds of Life Insurance Policy
Section 101 states that gross income does not include amounts re-
ceived under a life insurance contract, unless the life insurance policy
is transferred for valuable consideration. 66 In the latter situation, the
63. Id.
64. See Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940). In Evans, the taxpayer
sold stock to his son-in-law under an agreement that the son-in-law would pay an
annuity to the taxpayer for his life, and on taxpayer's death to his wife for life. The
court there stated:
But, as a transaction which originally is not entered into for profit may by later
change become one for profit . . . and, hence, susceptible of producing gain or
loss recognizable as such for income tax purposes, just so may a transaction
which is entered into for profit become one not for profit when the owner's ulti-
mate disposition of the property evidences a change in the nature of the trans-
action's intended purpose. The disposition of property as well as its acquisition is
material to the question whether the transaction was entered into for profit within
the contemplation of the income tax law .... Therefore, unless the [taxpayer] is
able to show that the transaction for which a deduction for loss is claimed was
throughout a transaction for profit, he is not entitled to claim the benefit of de-
duction for loss . ...
Id. at 962.
65. Estate of Miller, 27 Tax. Ct. Mem. Dec. 1140 (1968), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1405
(4th Cir. 1970). In Miller, an estate's interest in a family partnership was sold to one
of the children for less than half of its fair market value. The court held that the
transaction was merely intended to equalize the family property holdings, and was
not a transaction entered into for profit.
66. I.R.C. § 101.
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exclusion does not exceed the actual value of the consideration plus
premiums and other amounts subsequently paid by the transferee.67
Consequently, if an antenuptial contract provides that a life insurance
policy upon the life of one spouse be transferred to the other, it is
likely that the transfer will be held to be for valuable consideration,
and therefore some of the proceeds will be included in gross income.
Under the reasoning of Farid-Es-Sultaneh,68 a spouse who surren-
ders his or her marital rights has paid valuable consideration and
takes as a purchaser. The rights surrendered are presumed to be equal
to the fair market value of the property transferred, which, in the case
of a life insurance policy, is its cash surrender value.69 As a result,
when policy proceeds are paid to a transferee spouse, only the value of
the policy at the time of the transfer and any premiums and additional
sums paid by the transferee are excluded from gross income.70
In summary, a transferee's basis of property transferred pursuant to
an antenuptial contract is the fair market value of the property; the
transferor of appreciated property recognizes any taxable gain on the
transfer of appreciated property, but losses are not deductible; and
proceeds of a life insurance policy received by a transferee are only
partially excluded from gross income.
IV. COMMUNITY PROPERTY JURISDICTIONS
Marital property rights in a community property jurisdiction are
quite different from common law property rights, in that each spouse
immediately has an equal interest in community property acquired
during marriage, 7' rather than the inchoate dower or curtesy rights
67. Hacker v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 659 (1937) (when taxpayer's father took
out a life insurance policy on his life and subsequently assigned all of his right, title,
and interest in it in return for payment to him of the cash surrender value of the
policy, the excess of the proceeds received over the amount paid for the policy by the
assignor constituted taxable income).
68. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). See notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
69. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
70. James F. Waters, Inc., v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1947). In
Waters, the insured had transferred policies on his life to a corporation of which he
was president in return for their cash surrender value. On his death, a successor cor-
poration holding the policies as a result of a merger was held liable for taxes on the
proceeds minus the consideration and the premiums paid by the corporations. The
case was decided prior to the adoption of § 101(a)(2)(B), which provides that if a
transfer for valuable consideration is to a corporation in which the insured is a share-
holder or officer, the proceeds are not included in gross income.
71. In re Jolly's Estate, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925); Yesler v. Hochstattler,
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which arise in a common law jurisdiction.72 Because each spouse ac-
quires an equal share in the community property,73 transfers of prop-
erty rarely are included in community property antenuptial contracts.
Federal tax consequences ensue, however, as in a common law juris-
diction, if the agreement does include a provision to transfer property.
In most community property jurisdictions, it is permissible to al-
ter community property consequences by agreement between the
spouses. 74 A common form of antenuptial property agreement is one
whereby the spouses agree, without presently transferring any consid-
eration, that all property and income acquired after the marriage will
be the separate property of each, rather than community property.75
The IRS has ruled that, for purposes of the income tax, this type of
agreement is effective to create separate rather than community in-
come,76 which will be taxed as the separate income of the spouse who
earns it.77
4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892); DEFUNIAK, supra note 10, § 66; Cross, supra note 6,
at 734. Property owned before marriage and property acquired after marriage by
gift, inheritance, bequest, or devise remain each spouse's separate property. Rico v.
Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465, 33 P. 480 (1893); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121
P. 544 (1912); In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944); DEFuNIAK,
supra note 10, §§ 63, 69; Cross, supra note 6, at 746. The general rule is that fruits
and profits of separate property are community property. Mire v. Sunray DX Oil Co.,
285 F. Supp. 885 (D.C. La. 1968); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 544 (1912);
Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W.2d 152 (1931); DEFUNIAK, supra, § 71. This
rule has been altered in a number of community property states, including Washington,
where the rents, issues, and profits of separate property remain separate property. In
re Pepper's Estate, 158 Cal. 619, 112 P. 62 (1910); In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d
112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010 & .020 (1976); DEFUNIAK,
supra note 10, § 72; Cross, supra note 6, at 768.
72. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS §§ 15, 29, 30 (2d ed. 1953).
73. In a community property jurisdiction, neither spouse has inchoate marital or
inheritance rights in the property of the other which he or she can release. Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930); Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d 844, 190 P.2d
575 (1948); Cross, supra note 6, at 734.
74. E.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1973); Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.120 (1976); DEFUNIAK, supra note 10, § 136 at 337; Cross, supra note 6,
at 798-802.
75. E.g., Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954). Spouses are
also permitted to agree that all separate property, either presently owned or subse-
quently acquired, will be community property. Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-42 I.R.B. 6;
Cross, supra note 6, at 809.
76. Rev. Rul. 73-390, 1973-2 C.B. 12. Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-391, 1973-2 C.B. 12,
which provides that, absent an agreement between a husband and wife to change
characterization of separate and community property invested in a partnership, the
partnership income derived from their separate property is treated as their separate
income and that derived from their community property and from a partner's salary
is community income.
77. An agreement that the property acquired by each spouse after marriage shall
remain separate property theoretically involves gift tax consequences, but no case
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V. CONCLUSION
Prospective spouses are increasingly resorting to antenuptial con-
tracts, many of which operate to transfer the property of one spouse
to another. Practitioners drafting antenuptial contracts should be
aware that transfers of property provided for in such contracts can be
taxable events under both the gift and income tax provisions of the
Code. A transferor of appreciated property must pay an income tax
because he or she "realizes" a gain on the transfer of such property in
exchange for the release of an independent legal obligation, namely,
the prospective spouse's marital property rights. Unfortunately, the
IRS and the courts reach a different conclusion in imposing a gift tax
on such a transfer. In this context, the surrender of marital property
rights does not constitute adequate consideration; therefore, the trans-
feror must pay the tax.
Under the estate tax provisions of the Code, a marital deduction
will generally be allowed for property passing from a decedent to a
surviving spouse pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, because the
transfer is similar to a devise or bequest. However, a deduction will
not be allowed as a claim against the estate under section 2053, be-
cause the claim must be based on a transfer for adequate considera-
tion; here, as in the gift tax context, the surrender of marital rights
does not meet the criterion.
has been found imposing gift tax liability. The gift tax possibilities are illustrated by
the following example. Husband earns $30,000 annually and wife earns $10,000.
Under the community property system each spouse owns a one-half interest in the
total earned-$20,000 each. Husband and wife have agreed that their earnings will
remain separate property; as a result, husband has acquired $30,000 rather than
$20,000. In effect, wife has made a taxable gift to husband of $10,000. This theory
rests on the proposition that the property earned is at the first instance community
property, and then is transferred as a gift by force of the agreement. But see Cross,
supra note 6, at 809.
Ordinarily, the gift tax would be due the year of the marriage. Rev. Rul. 69-347,
1969-1 C.B. 227. The gift, however, would be impossible to value until the income is
actually earned, so the liability would be postponed until the end of each taxable
year. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (193 1). If both spouses earned or acquired prop-
erty of equal value which would have been community property during the course of
the year, no gift tax would result. However, as discussed above, if one spouse earned
substantially more than the other, the transfer would be subject to the gift tax. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 77-359, 1977-42 I.R.B. 6 (dealing with the income and gift tax conse-
quences of either oral or written agreements in Washington which provide that all
presently owned and subsequently acquired real and personal property will be com-
munity property). The ruling stated that the gift tax is applicable to the conversion
of separate property into community property, and that to the extent that the agree-
ment affects income from separate real property and not the property itself, spouses
may not split that income when they file separate returns.
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In community property states, prospective spouses may sign an ante-
nuptial community property agreement which alters the normal com-
munity property rules. This agreement may provide that all property
acquired after marriage by each spouse, including income, will be the
separate property of each, or it could provide that all separate property
will become community property. There are possible income and gift
tax consequences, but beyond this unique type of agreement, the federal
tax consequences of transfers by antenuptial agreements are the same
in community property states as in common law states.
The antenuptial agreement is a valuable tool, providing flexibility
for prospective spouses within the marital property systems. Aware-
ness of the pitfalls and inconsistencies in the tax law governing the
transfer of property under such agreements will enable practitioners to
use this tool to best serve their clients' needs.
Patricia Murray
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